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VIII. INSURANCEt
A. Pollution Exclusion Litigation
1. Introduction
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recently entertained
numerous disputes involving environmental liability insurance
law. The stakes in these disputes are high, given the retroactive
application and potentially limitless liability imposed upon
parties by both federal and state environmental cleanup
statutes.1 The insurance industry, although acknowledging that
its standard insuring agreements provide coverage for liability
emanating from environmental contamination,2 faces a massive
amount of potential liability.' Consequently, litigation regarding
the viability of pollution exclusion clauses within insurance
contracts has been active, as parties disagree over the allocation
and applicability of various liability policy provisions.4 This
section is a summary and brief analysis of four recent Minnesota
Supreme Court cases ruling on this ever-evolving area of law and
policy in Minnesota.
t The author acknowledges and appreciates the generous assistance of Clarance
E. Haglund and Britton D. Weimer in the selection of the Insurance Law cases
summarized in this section.
1. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 523
N.W.2d 657, 660-61 (Minn. 1994) (citing the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1983),
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 and MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.01-115B.24 (1994) (MERI.A)).
2. Northern States Power, 523 N.W.2d at 660-61 n.5 (citing Thomas C. Mielen-
hausen, Insurance Coverage for Environmental and Toxic Tort Claims, 17 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 945, 950-51 (1991)); see also Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
457 N.W.2d 175, 183 (Minn. 1980) (noting that insurers were aware of potential liability
for groundwater contamination upon issuance of policy).
3. Northern States Power, 523 N.W.2d at 660 (citing Kenneth S. Abraham, Cleaning
Up The Environmental Liability Insurance Mess, 27 VAL. U. L REV. 601, 603 (1993));
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
Toxic TORT AND HAZARDOUS WASTE IN INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES, 1 (1991)).
4. Id.
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2. Restricting the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine and
Defining "Atmosphere"
Asbestos contamination of air within a building is not
contamination of the "atmosphere." In Board of Regents of the
University of Minnesota v. Royal Insurance Company of America,' the
Minnesota Supreme Court determined, within the context of the
specific pollution exclusion at issue,' that a "fine line" distinc-
tion can be made between asbestos-contaminated air that is
within a buildinI and contaminated air that is outside a building
("ambient air"). Thus, a pollution exclusion clause containing
the term "atmosphere," without a qualification of where the air
happens to be, does not exclude coverage for liability that arises
from contaminated air within a building.' Notwithstanding such
liberal semantic construction, the court asserted the reasonable
expectations doctrine9 is to be narrowly applied in Minneso-
ta.'
0
5. 517 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1994).
6. The pollution exclusion clause excludes coverage for the following:
Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal,
release, or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals,
liquids, or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants,
into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but
this exclusion does not apply if the discharge, dispersal, release or escape is
sudden and accidental.
Id. at 890. The court's contextual analysis of the pollution exclusion clause was
interesting. In describing other elements of the natural world, the court noted that the
exclusion clause at issue used the word "land" rather than "property" and, with respect
to "water," the clause used the terms "any watercourse or body of water." Id. at 893. The
court thus reasoned that the use of "atmosphere" without qualifying terms, was intended
to "encompass the natural resources of this planet in their natural setting, namely, land,
the atmosphere, and bodies of water." Id.
7. Id. at 893.
8. Id.
9. The reasonable expectations doctrine is, arguably, the most liberal, insured-
friendly policy construction doctrine available to litigants. Under the doctrine, the
courts do not enforce hidden exclusions that are contrary to the insured's objectively
reasonable expectation of coverage. CLARANCE E. HAGGLUND ET AL., MINNESOTA
INSURANCE LAW, 18-20 (1995); see also Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins.
Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985); Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth,
432 N.W.2d 495, 499 (Minn. Ct App. 1988).
In other words, the "objectively reasonable expectations of the applicants and
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored, even
though painstaking study of the policy or revisions would have negated those expec-
tations." Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 277 (quoting Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at
Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970)).
10. Board of Regents, 517 N.W.2d at 891.
[Vol. 22
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In the early 1970s, the University of Minnesota installed fire-
proofing materials that contained asbestos in some of its
buildings, which had to be removed subsequently." The Board
of Regents of the University and the State of Minnesota (Re-
gents) sued, among others, the manufacturer of the fire-proofing
materials and its successor in interest (manufacturer), seeking
recovery of the cost of removing the asbestos from the build-
ings. 2 The manufacturer's liability insurers denied coverage
under their respective policies, claiming the pollution exclusions
within both primary and excess liability policies precluded
coverage."3 Thereafter, the parties entered into a "Miller
Shugart" 4 settlement agreement and the Regents brought an
action against the manufacturer's insurers. 5 The trial court
granted summary judgment in the Regents' favor. However, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that coverage was
excluded by virtue of the pollution exclusion clauses in both the
primary and excess insurance policies. 6 The Regents peti-
tioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for further review, focusing
only on construction of the pollution exclusion clauses.'"
The exclusion clause in the primary policy was the first to
be construed by the Board of Regents court. s The clause exclud-
ed coverage for the following:
[B]odily injury or property damage arising out of the
discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of smoke, vapors, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids, or gases, waste
materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants, into
or upon land, the atmosphere, or any water course or body
of water; but this exclusion does not apply if the discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.19
The Regents' central argument against the relevancy of the
11. Id. at 889.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 890.
14. "Miller Shugart" settlements were established in Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d
729 (Minn. 1982). Basically, the insured confesses judgment in favor of the plaintiff in
exchange for an assignment of the insured's claim against its insurer under the relevant
policy. Id.
15. Board of Regents, 517 N.W.2d at 889-90.
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clause was founded upon the reasonable expectations doc-
trine.2 Relying on a court of appeals opinion under a similar
fact situation,21 the Regents argued that the insured could not
have reasonably expected that its comprehensive general liability
policy would exclude coverage for unexpected damages within
the buildings caused by the installation of building materials.22
The Board of Regents court, however, significantly restricted
the scope of the reasonable expectations doctrine to factual
circumstances similar to Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western National
Mutual Insurance Co. 23 and expressly overruled any contrary
rulings of Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth.24  The
pollution exclusion clause in Board of Regents was found to plainly
designate, as an exclusion in the comprehensive general liability
policy, coverage for environmental pollution. 5 In the court's
words, "[t]he reasonable expectation test is not a license to
ignore the pollution exclusion in this case, nor to rewrite the
exclusion solely to conform to a result that the insured might
prefer."
26
The Board of Regents court, after disposing of two other
arguments put forth by the Regents, 27 finally agreed with the
20. See supra note 9.
21. See Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495, 499 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988). The Grinnel! court applied the reasonable expectations doctrine to
provide coverage for damage caused by formaldehyde fumes that were emitted from
insulation material installed in a residence. Id. The court held the insureds could not
have reasonably expected that their general liability policy could be read to exclude
.unexpected damage due to installation of building materials in a home." Id.
22. Board of Regents, 517 N.W.2d at 891 (citing GrinneUMut. Reinsurance, 432 N.W.2d
at 499).
23. The Board of Regents court noted that the Iowa Supreme Court has also limited
the reasonable expectations doctrine to "egregious situation [s]" similar to those in the
Atwater Creamery case. Id. at 891 n. 4 (citing AID (Mut.) Ins. v. Steffen, 423 N.W.2d 189,
192 (Iowa 1988)).
24. Id. at 891.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. The first argument involved the "sudden and accidental" exception to the
pollution exclusion. Id. at 892. The court held the "sudden and accidental" exception
did not apply to asbestos fibers that were released gradually over a period of time from
the insured's product. Id. (ruling "[t]he word 'sudden' is used in tandem with the word
'accidental,' and 'accidental' in liability insurance parlance means unexpected or unin-
tended") (citing Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72, 76-77, 240
N.W.2d 310, 312-13 (1976), overruled in part on other grounds by Prahm v. Rupp Constr.
Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 1979)). The court concluded that "thus to construe
'sudden' to mean 'unexpected' is to create a redundancy." Id.
The second argument was that asbestos fibers are a naturally-occurring mineral and
[Vol. 22
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Regents' construction of the exclusion clause language.2" The
construction entailed a liberal reading of the word "atmosphere"
to not include contaminated air within a building.29 The court
found within the context of the exclusion language, that the
term "atmosphere" was not intended to include air within a
building.' The court, with the help of the words of an infa-
mous prince of Denmark,I derived a temporal distinction
between "atmosphere" and "air":
"Atmosphere" (in its ordinarily understood physical sense) is
another name for "air," but-and this is what is important-it
is air thought of as being in a particular place. We would not
say that the atmosphere in a room is stuffy, but rather that
the air is stuffy. We think of atmosphere as the air surround-
ing our planet, as when Hamlet spoke of "this most excellent
canopy, the air." (Act II, Scene ii). So it is that we speak of
releasing a balloon into the atmosphere.
The court then looked to the context of the term "atmo-
sphere" within pollution exclusion clauses in general and noted
that exclusions are directed primarily at claims involving
pollution of the natural environment in its natural setting.
3 2
Contaminated air within a building was deemed to not present
a harm to the "surrounding natural environment, at least not
until it escapes into that environment so as to cause personal
not a waste material and hence not contemplated as pollution under the exclusion. Id.
In response, the court looked to the "other irritants, contaminants, or pollutants"
language of the exclusion and eloquently disposed of the argument by stating, "we
would be doing a disservice to the English language if we were to say that asbestos
fibers, which are a health hazard because of their irritant effects on the human body,
were not an irritant." Id.
28. Id. at 892-93.
29. Id. at 892.
30. Id. at 893.
31. The Board of Regents court borrowed a phrase from Shakespeare's "Hamlet":
"this most excellent canopy, the air." Id. at 892. The context from which this phrase
was derived seems particularly appropriate to modem environmental pollution
litigation:
I have of late-but wherefore I know not-lost all my mirth, forgone all
custom of exercises; and indeed it goes so heavily with my disposition that this
goodly frame, the earth, seems to me a sterile promontory; this most excellent
canopy, the air, look you, this brave o'erhanging firmament, this majestical
roof fretted with golden fire, why, it appeareth nothing to me but a foul and
pestilent congregation of vapors.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK 1156, lines 296-
304 (G. BLAKEMORE EVANS ET AL., ED. THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE (1974)).
32. Board of Regents, 517 N.W.2d at 892-93; see E. Joshua Rosenkranz, The Polluion
Exclusion Clause Through the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L. J. 1237 (1986).
1996]
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injury .... ." Therefore, consistent with other courts' conclu-
sions on similar language, 4 a "fine line" was established, and
the pollution exclusion clause within the primary policies of the
present case 5 was ruled to not apply to asbestos-contaminated
air within a building.3 6
Justice Gardebring, writing a poignant dissent, was of the
opinion that the "fine line" drawn by the majority was "one
through which air passes freely.""7 Justice Gardebring agreed
with the court of appeals' view of the distinction between air
inside and outside of a building as being arbitrary, because
buildings are not "hermetically sealed."' Finding nothing in
the meaning of the word "atmosphere" to only include outdoor
air, Justice Gardebring would not have found coverage under the
policy.
39
The Board of Regents case stands for the assertion that the
reasonable expectations doctrine will be narrowly applied by
Minnesota courts and only in "egregious" situations. Given the
majority's "fine line" construction of the language of the
exclusion in Board of Regents, it is evident that liberal linguistic
construction-limited (arguably) only by the creativity of the
insured's counsel-is still available to insureds to eviscerate
pollution exclusion clauses and thereby obtain coverage for their
loss.
3. "Pro Rata by Time" Allocation of Liability Among
Successively-Triggered Multiple Insurance Policies
Assume that a company is found to be liable for the
abatement of a toxic chemical within a parcel of its land. Also,
assume that the contamination occurred over several years and
33. Board of Regents, 517 N.W.2d at 893.
34. Id. (citing United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 578
N.E.2d 926, 933 (Ill. 1991)).
35. Id. The pollution exclusion clauses in the excess policies included language
that referred to the natural environment only. Id. at 893-94. Thus, the excess policies'
exclusion was found viable by the court. See id. One of the excess policy's pollution
exclusion clause provided that "[t]his policy shall not apply ... to liability for
contamination or pollution of land, water, air, or real or personal property or any
injuries or damages resulting therefrom caused by an occurrence." Id. at 893. The
other excess policy pollution exclusion language was similar to the above clause. Id.
36. Id.
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that the contamination was continuous for the entire period.'
If the company establishes multiple insurance policies were in
effect during successive periods over the several years of
contamination, what is the best means of allocating the total loss
among the multiple insurance policies? A recent Minnesota
Supreme Court case held that where multiple and successive
insurance policies are concerned and where the pollution is
continuous, each triggered policy must bear a share of the
aggregate liability based on the period of time that the each
policy was in effect.4" In the words of the Northern States Power
Co. v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of America court, "each triggered
policy... bears a share of the total damages proportionate to
the number of years it was on the risk relative to the total
number of years of coverage triggered."42 However, given the
complex and fact-specific nature of environmental pollution
litigation, the Northern States Power case is not expected to be the
"last word" on this issue.
3
In 1981, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency discovered
that groundwater contamination had occurred at two properties
located in Faribault, Minnesota, that were both owned by
Northern States Power Company (NSP). 4 The contamination
was caused by coal tars and spent oxide wastes, which were
produced by coal-tar gasification facilities located on the land in
the early 1900's.4' NSP was ultimately found liable for the
cleanup costs.' The company subsequently sought reimburse-
ment of the cleanup costs from thirteen separate insurance
companies from which NSP had purchased liability insurance
40. In Northern States Pouer Co. v. Fidelity & Casaly Co. of Am., the contamination
was by "coal tars and spent oxide waste" that percolated through the soil over time and
contaminated the groundwater in the land. Northern States Power, 523 N.W.2d 657, 659
(Minn. 1994). Another example would be an underground fuel storage tank that slowly
leaks its contents into the soil over several years.
41. Id. at 663-64.
42. Id. at 663. This allocation is referred to by the court as a "pro-rata by time on
the risk" allocation. Id.
43. Id. at 665. The court also noted that "environmental insurance law, like any
other area of law, will have to develop over time and trial courts must be flexible in
responding to new fact situations." Id.
44. Id. at 659.
45. Id.
46. NSP entered into a consent order and was required to pay over $1.6 million
in remedial action costs. Id.
1996]
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during the relevant period of time.4 7
Twelve of the insurance companies settled with NSP on
terms which were analogous to a "Pierringer" agreement." The
one remaining insurance carrier, St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company, (St. Paul) did not settle.49 St. Paul chose
to deny coverage, arguing, among other theories, that language
in their policies referring to "other insurance" made the St. Paul
policies excess policies to those of the settling carriers." St.
Paul further argued NSP failed to show that the settlement did
not fully compensate for the loss and that therefore no excess
coverage was required."
The trial court agreed with St. Paul's argument and granted
summary judgment in its favor.5 2  The Minnesota Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the "total policy insuring intent"
of the parties indicated that the St. Paul policies were, in fact,
primary policies.3 The court of appeals also held that the total
damages were to be allocated using a "pro rata by limits"
allocation method among the carriers in proportion to the injury
or harm that occurred during each policy period. 4
47. Id. The relevant period of time occurred from 1946 to 1985. Id.
48. Id.; see also Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963) (establishing an
alternative form of release for defendants in multi-defendant litigation).
49. Northern States Power, 523 N.W.2d at 659.
50. Id. at 660.
51. Id.
52. Id. The trial court held the language in the St. Paul policies did not conflict
with the "other insurance" clauses of the settling carriers' policies. Consequently, the
St. Paul policies were "excess" to the other policies. Id. The subsequent failure of NSP
to show that the settlement agreement with the other carriers was insufficient to meet
NSP's costs was fatal to its claim. Id.
53. Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 504 N.W.2d 240, 247
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (adopting the "trigger rule" discussed in Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home
Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1391-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)).
54. Northern States Power, 523 N.W.2d at 660. A "pro rata by limits" allocation
method involves an allocation of liability to each policy, according to the actual harm
that occurs during the policy period. Id. In other words, if damages are proven to have
occurred during the policy period, then the insurance company is required to pay the
damages, but only "as proven" by the policy holder. Id. at 663. The policy holder is
therefore required to prove the amount of damages incurred during each applicable
policy period, if scientifically possible. Id. The Northern States Power court noted that
although this method is most consistent with CGL policy language, which limits liability
to damages that are incurred "during the policy period," such an allocation scheme is
nonetheless "unattractive given the scientific complexity of the issues involved, the
extended period of time over which damages may have occurred before discovery, and
the number of parties potentially involved." Id. at 663 (citing KENNETH S. ABRAHAM,
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF Toxic TORT AND
[Vol. 22
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 22
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol22/iss1/22
INSURANCE
The Northern States Power court affirmed the appellate court's
determination that the St. Paul policies were primary policies,5
but remanded the case on the allocation of damages issue.56
The court ruled that the "pro rata by limits" allocation method
implemented by the court of appeals was inconsistent with prior
Minnesota law. Minnesota uses an "actual injury" theory of
determining whether a policy has been "triggered." A policy is
triggered by an occurrence causing damage for which an
insurance company is held liable.
Minnesota applies an "injury in fact" or an "actual injury"
theory when determining whether sufficient damage has
occurred to invoke coverage under a commercial general liability
policy (CGL)."5 The reasoning of the "actual injury" trigger
theory is that under the theory, the insurer is liable only for
"those damages which occurred during its policy period," no
more and no less. 9 Where the injury is continuous in nature
and multiple policies are concurrent, the "pro rata by limits"
allocation method would require the insured to prove the
amount of damages incurred during each policy period, up to
each policy limit.' Thus, insurers with higher limits would be
liable for damages incurred outside of the respective policy
period.6
The Northern States Power court deemed this allocation
HAZARDOUS WASTE INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES, 120 (1991)). The court further noted
such an allocation method would be cost-prohibitive in cases involving relatively small
amounts. Id. The fact-dependent nature of the value determination would reduce the
likelihood of settlement. Id. Consequently, an insured would face "enormous difficulty"
if required to prove the amount of damage that occur during each policy period. Id.
55. Id. at 659. The court found that no evidence was established by St. Paul to
indicate NSP had any other insurance during the period of time that the St. Paul
policies were in effect. Id. Thus, St. Paul's argument that its policies were "in excess"
to the settling policies was found to be untenable, notwithstanding the fact that the
policies were labeled "Excess Liability Polic[ies]." Id. at 600.
56. Id. at 664.
57. Id. at 662.
58. Id. (ruling "[wie believe [the injury in fact triggering theory] is the most
consistent [theory] with standard CGL policy language"); see also Industrial Steel
Container Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d 156, 159-60 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (applying the "injury in fact" triggering theory in the context of long-term
groundwater contamination damage). But cf Singsaas v. Diederich, 307 Minn. 153, 155-
56, 238 N.W.2d 878, 880-81 (1976) (emphasizing insurer's liability for damages
occurring during policy period but not beyond).
59. Northern States Power, 523 N.W.2d at 662.
60. Id. at 662-63.
61. Id. at 662.
1996]
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method to be inconsistent with the "actual injury" trigger
theory.6 The court chose instead to implement a "pro rata by
time on the risk" allocation method.' Under this method, the
insured is initially required to establish that a policy is triggered
by showing that at least "some damage occurred during the
policy period."' Where the pollution is continuous in nature,
the insured must first establish the contamination period, a
period of time beginning from when the contamination first
starts and ending when the contamination ceased or was
discovered.65 The insured then must show the relevant policy
was in effect at some point of time within the contamination
period.66  The court is then responsible for allocating the
damage among the policies that are triggered.67
The total damage is allocated among all the triggered
policies according to each relevant policy period and in propor-
tion to the aggregate period of time within which the pollution
occurred.' In other words, the contamination period (for
example, ten years) is placed in the denominator, and the policy
period at issue (for example, one year) is the numerator.69
The resulting fraction represents the total liability that is to be
allocated to the specific policy at issue.7° If the policy requires
the insured to pay a deductible prior to invoking actual payment
62. Id.
63. Id. at 663.
64. Id. (citing 19 GEORGE COUCH ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 79.345 (2d ed.
rev. 1983)).
65. Id. at 664.
66. Id. at 663-64. If the insurer then wishes to establish that no appreciable
damage occurred during its particular policy period, then the burden is upon the
insurer. Id. at 664.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The Northern States Power court provided the following example to illustrate
the allocation method:
If, for example, contamination occurred over a period of 10 years, 1/10th of
the damage would be allocable to the period of time that a policy in force for
1 year was on the risk and 3/10ths of the damage would be allocable to the
period of time a 3-year policy was in force.
Id.
70. Extending the Northern States Power court's example further, 1/10th of the
aggregate liability ($1.6 million) is equal to $160,000. This amount is the allocated
portion of damages attributable to a policy with a period of one year. The $160,000 is
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by the insurer, then the insured must pay the specified
amount.
71
In Northern States Power, the St. Paul policies provided that St.
Paul would pay, on behalf of NSP, "all sums which [NSP] shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of an injury
to or destruction of tangible property, including the loss of use
thereof."7  On remand, NSP will be required to demonstrate
that some damage in fact occurred while the policy was in
effect.7" Once established, the policy is deemed to have been
"triggered," and St. Paul will subsequently be required, under the
terms of the policy, to reimburse NSP.7 '4 The terms of the St.
Paul policies also provide that St. Paul is liable only for liability
incurred in excess of various specified amounts, of which NSP
must first pay.75
The "pro rata by time on the risk" allocation method, as
established by the court in Northern States Power, is another
addendum to an evolving body of jurisprudence involving
environmental liability insurance law.7' This method is in
accord with judicial economy. As courts respond with flexibility
to new factual situations77 and arguments by various litigants,
there is no doubt that the Northern States Power court's prediction
that this case will not be "the 'last word' in this area" 8 will be
proven accurate.
71. Northern States Power, 523 N.W.2d at 664. The author notes it is likely that the
amount owed by the insured, if any, will simply be used to offset the liability of the
insurer in such circumstances.
72. Id. at 659. The policies further limited the amount that St. Paul would pay to
"$5,000,000.00 for each occurrence or series of occurrences arising out of one
event ... which occur during the policy period." Id.
73. Id. at 661.
74. Id. at 661-62; see also id. at 659 n.3 (quoting William R. Hickman & Mary R. De
Young, Allocation of Environmental Cleanup Liability Between Successive Insurers, 17 N. KY.
L. REv. 291, 293 (1990)).
75. Id. at 664. For instance, NSP must pay the first $25,000 of one policy and
$100,000 of another. Id.
76. Id. at 665.
77. The Minnesota Supreme Court has, in fact, declined to apply the allocation
method of Northern States Power in a case where the contamination arose from a single
spill. SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 318 (Minn. 1995). The SCSC
court, however, had the benefit of a jury determination that the "damage was not
divisible and that it was the result of a sudden and accidental occurrence." Id.
78. Northern States Power, 523 N.W.2d at 665.
1996]
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4. Equitable Estoppel does not Operate to Bar Application
of Pollution Exclusion Clauses
It is unreasonable for an insured to rely on representations
that are contrary to the plain meaning of the language in an
insurance policy.79 Thus, the doctrine of equitable estoppel
cannot be invoked to preclude the effect of a standard pollution
exclusion clause in an insurance policy." Even if representa-
tions to the contrary were made by the insurance industry with
respect to the effect of the pollution exclusion clause, the
doctrine will not apply.8'
Prior to developing a parcel of land in Minnetonka,
Minnesota, the insured land owner in Anderson v. Minnesota
Insurance Guaranty Association did an environmental assessment
that disclosed the existence of a former dump site on two acres
of the land.8" After the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
(MPCA) was notified, the land owner was required to pay for a
remedial investigation regarding the nature and scope of
contamination in the dump area.8" The land owner tendered
a claim for defense and indemnification costs to its insurers;
however, they both denied coverage.84 The land owner subse-
quently brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking a
determination that the relevant policies provided coverage for
the costs incurred.85
The land owner moved the trial court for permission to
amend the complaint to add a claim of equitable estoppel to
preclude the insurers from invoking the standard pollution
exclusions within the policies.86 The land owner asserted the
insurance industry should not invoke the pollution exclusion
clause in a manner inconsistent with representations made to
insurance regulators in obtaining approval for the clause.87
The trial court denied the land owner's motion, finding that
79. Anderson v. Minnesota Ins. Guar. Ass'n., 534 N.W.2d 706, 709-10 (Minn. 1995).
80. Id. at 710.
81. Id.
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the equitable estoppel claim lacked legal merit.' On appeal,
a split appellate court ruled that equitable estoppel was a viable
claim to assert against the applicability of the pollution exclusion
clause. 89  The insurers appealed, and the Anderson court re-
versedf90
The insurance policies in effect during the relevant time
period were CGLs.91 The policies included a standard pollu-
tion exclusion clause promulgated by the Insurance Rating
Board (IRB) and the Mutual Insurance Rating Board (MIRB).92
Prior to including the pollution exclusion clause in insurance
policies, insurers are required to have the language approved by
the Minnesota Commissioner of Insurance." Upon introduc-
tion of the exclusion clause to the Commissioner of Insurance,
the IRB and the MIRB submitted findings On behalf of their
members which included an explanation of the pollution
exclusion clause.94
The land owner argued that the insurer's representations to
the Commissioner of Insurance, regarding the pollution
exclusion, mislead the insureds.9" The insurer should, there-
fore, be barred from applying the pollution exclusion clause in
88. Id. at 707.
89. Id. at 707-08 (citing Anderson v. Minnesota Ins. Guar. Ass'n., 520 N.W.2d 155,
165 (Minn. CL App. 1994) (Holton, J., dissenting)).
90. Id. at 710.
91. Id. at 708.
92. Id. The IRB and MIRB were insurance rating bureaus for the insurance
companies involved in this case. Id. at 708 n.2. Ajoint committee, maintained by the
bureaus, was involved in drafting the pollution exclusion clause. Id. (citing RONALD R.
ROBINSON, THE BEST OF INTENTIONS: DRAFTING THE 1966 OCCURRENCE, AND THE 1973
POLLUTION EXCLUSION POLICY LANGUAGE 565, 575 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 690, Environmental Insurance Coverage Claims and Litig.,
1994)).
93. See MINN. STAT. § 70A.06, subd. 2 (1994).
94. Anderon, 534 N.W.2d at 708-09. The explanation was as follows:
Coverage for pollution or contamination is not provided in most cases under
present policies because the damages can be said to be expected or intended,
and thus are excluded by the definition of occurrence. The above exclusion
clarifies the situation so as to avoid any questions of intent. Coverage is continued
for pollution or contamination-caused injuries when the pollution or
contamination results from an accident, except that no coverage will be
provided under certain operations for injuries arising out of discharge or
escape of oil into any body of water.
Id. at 708.
95. Id. at 708-09. The landowner contended the pollution exclusion was
represented as a "clarification of existing coverage," rather than a reduction. Id.
1996]
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a manner not consistent with the representations.
The Anderson court first established that an essential element
of equitable estoppel is reasonable reliance.97  Given a prior
supreme court construction of the pollution exclusion clause as
"clear and unambiguous,"" the Anderson court ruled that
"reliance on any explanations contrary to the unambiguous
meaning of the policy language is, as a matter of law, unreason-
able.""
The land owner in Anderson asserted a creative and poten-
tially devastating argument against the application of the
pollution exclusion clause. Accordingly, equitable estoppel,
while given merit by the appellate court, did not persuade the
supreme court. Equitable estoppel can not be used to limit the
application of the pollution exclusion clause.
5. Burdens of Proof Shift in Pollution Exclusion Clause
Litigation
The application and effect of the terms of a pollution
exclusion clause within a CGL policy involve a burden shifting
interplay between the insurer and insured. The rule established
by the SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co." court closely
adheres to the maxim that the insured must first establish
coverage under the policy, while the insurer bears the burden of
96. Id.
97. Id. at 709 (citing Northern Petrochem Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 277
N.W.2d 408, 410 (Minn. 1979); United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 480 F.2d
1095' 1099 (8th Cir. 1973)).
98. Id. (quoting Board of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888, 892
(1994)). The Board of Regents case is summarized supra, part A.2.
99. Anderson, 534 N.W.2d at 709. The Anderson court also agreed with the dissenting
appellate court justice's opinion that the following argument (made by one of the
insurers) was persuasive:
A regulator, or insured, who reads only the endorsement heading CONTAMI-
NATION OR POLLUTION EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT and later claims
to have been induced to conclude that the endorsement would not actually
exclude coverage has, as a matter of law, acted unreasonably. See Anderson,
520 N.W.2d at 166 (Holtan, J. dissenting) (stating "[e]ven if there were
misrepresentations, if the application of the pollution exclusion clause is
clear... how can it be said that the Commissioner reasonably relied on the
IRB? There can be no reason but a reliance ...
Id.
100. 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995). This opinion was issued by the Minnesota
Supreme Court to amend and clarify its previous opinion, reported as SCSC Corp. v.
Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 603 (Minn. 1995).
[Vol. 22
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proving no coverage." 1 The burden must accordingly fluctu-
ate between the litigants in the context of determining the
viability of a pollution exclusion clause." 2
The insured in SCSC operated a dry cleaning and laundry
supply distribution center, which included the distribution and
sale of a hazardous cleaning chemical.' The chemical was
found to have leaked into the soil underneath the insured's
facilities, ultimately contaminating the groundwater. 4 The
insured incurred significant expense in remedying the contami-
nation, as did the MPCA. 5 The insured requested that its
insurers reimburse it for the costs and pay for future costs
associated with the cleanup. 0 6 The insurers refused to take a
position on coverage until more evidence could be established
with respect to the nature of the contamination.' 7
Subsequently, the insured brought an action seeking a
declaration from the court that the relevant polices provided
coverage for the cleanup expenses and further requested
compensatory damages.' The trial court denied summary
judgment motions by the insurers and the jury returned a verdict
in favor of the insured.1 9 The jury determined the contamina-
tion was the result of an "unintended, unexpected, sudden and
accidental event, and that the damage was neither divisible nor
attributable to an overriding cause.""0 The trial court awarded
the insured nearly $1,000,000 in damages, which included an
enhanced award for attorney's fees."' The Minnesota Court
of Appeals affirmed in all respects, except for the enhanced
101. SCSC, 536 N.W.2d at 313; see Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308,
310 (Minn. 1989); Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins. Co.,
383 N.W.2d 645, 652 (Minn 1986); Boedigheimer v. Taylor, 287 Minn. 323, 329, 178
N.W.2d 610, 614 (1970); see also CLARANCE E. HAGGLUND ET AL., MINNESOTA INSURANCE
LAW, 38-51 (1995) (providing a thorough background analysis of CGL policies and CGL
policy construction in Minnesota).
102. SCSC, 536 N.W.2d at 313-14.
103. Id. at 308.
104. Id. at 309.
105. Id. at 310.
106. Id. at 309.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 310. The MPCA also moved the court for reimbursement of expenses
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portion of the attorney fees award.11 2  The insurers ap-
pealed.
113
After ruling that summaryjudgment was properly denied by
the trial court, the Minnesota Supreme Court responded in
detail to the insurer's argument regarding the appropriate
distribution of the burden of proof upon the litigants at
trial." 4 The court ruled that once the insured establishes a
prima facie case of coverage under the terms of the policy, the
insured is "entitled to go to a jury.""5 The insurer then must
prove, as an affirmative defense, the applicability of the exclu-
sion, if it exists, within the policy.1 This will be narrowly
interpreted by the court against the insurer.1 7  After the
insurer has established the viability of the exclusion, the burden
then returns to the insured to establish the applicability of any
exceptions to the exclusion clause, which would operate to
restore coverage."' Finally, if an overriding, non-insured cause
is involved, the burden rests upon the insurer to show that the
non-covered cause is an overriding cause of the damages
(another affirmative defense available to the insurer)."'
The rule established in SCSC with respect to the insured's
burden to establish the applicability of an exception to the
pollution exclusion clause is a marked departure from prior
Minnesota case law.1 21 Previously, some courts have ruled the
112. The SCSC court agreed with the appellate court's ruling with respect to the
enhanced portion of the attorney fees award. Id. at 319 (citing Morrison v. Swenson,
274 Minn. 127, 137-38, 142 N.W.2d 640, 647 (1966) (finding attorney fees recoverable
in declaratory judgment action when there is a breach of a contractual duty); Lanoue
v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 1979) (defining breach of
duty to defend under insurance contract)).
113. Id. at 310.
114. Id.at3ll.
115. Id. at 313 (quoting Boedigheimer v. Taylor, 287 Minn. 323, 329, 178 N.W.2d
610, 614).
116. Id. at 313-14 (citing Boedigheimer, 287 Minn. at 329, 178 N.W.2d at 614 and
Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. 1989)).
117. Id. at 314 (citing Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben, 505 N.W.2d 323,
327 (Minn. 1993); Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d
271, 276 (Minn. 1985)).
118. Id. (citing Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 132, 140
(E.D. Pa. 1986)).
119. Id. at 313 (citing Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins.
Co., 383 N.W.2d 645, 653 (Minn. 1986)). Under the facts of the SCSC case, the court
determined, contrary to the insurers assertion, that the insurer must present evidence
establishing an overriding cause, not the insured. Id. at 314.
120. Id. at 314.
[Vol. 22
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insurer's burden of proving the applicability of the pollution
exclusion clause includes establishing the non-applicability of an
exception to the exclusion."' The SCSC court squarely reject-
ed this approach, ruling that it is better to require the insured
to prove the applicability of an exception to the exclusion clause
because the "insured is in a better position to obtain information
regarding whether the [contamination qualifies under the
exception].122
The shifting burdens of proof within the context of the
construction of a pollution exclusion clause were analyzed and
clarified by the SCSC court. Under SCSC, if the insured establish-
es coverage under the policy, the insurer must then show
applicability of the exclusion. If the exclusion operates to
exclude coverage for the loss, then the burden returns to the
insured to, once again, establish coverage by virtue of any
exceptions to the exclusion.
B. Intentional Act Exclusion Litigation
An insurance contract providing school administration
"wrongful act" liability insurance, which is read to provide
coverage for intentional age discrimination, is not a violation of
public policy in Minnesota. In Independent School District No. 697,
Eveleth v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Co,123 the Minnesota Supreme
Court enforced an insurance contract that was deemed to
"unambiguously provideE] coverage" for intentional age discrimi-
nation. 124
An employee of the Eveleth, Minnesota School District
("the district") 125 filed a claim with the Minnesota Department
of Human Rights ("the department"), alleging that the district
had violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act.126 The depart-
121. Id. (citing Dakhue Landfill, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 N.W.2d 798,
802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
122. Id.
123. 515 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1994).
124. Id. at 579.
125. The district's official title is "School District Number 697, Eveleth, Minnesota."
See id. at 576.
126. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 697 involved two separate and unrelated claims
brought against the district. One claim was for age discrimination, and the other was
for, among other damages, reinstatement pursuant to Minnesota Statutes § 125.12,
subdivision 6b (1988) (describing the reinstatement mechanism for teachers placed on
unrequested leave of absence). See id. at 577-79. Specifically, the employee alleged that
1996]
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ment investigated the allegations and found that there was
probable cause to believe the district had engaged in a discrimi-
natory practice. 127 Four months later, the district tendered a
defense of the claim to its liability insurance carrier which, after
an investigation of its own, denied coverage under the policy,
due to an alleged intentional act exclusion within the language
of the insurance contract.
1 28
The department subsequently issued a formal complaint
against the district.1 29 The district again tendered a defense to
its insurer, and the insurer denied coverage.13 0  The depart-
ment and the district, upon notice to the insurer, began
settlement discussions and eventually settled.13 1  The district
then commenced an action against its insurer to recover the
expenses it incurred in defending and settling the claim.1
3 2
The trial court granted the district's motion for summary
judgment, ruling that the insurer had a duty to defend the claim
due to her age, the district "altered her job duties, lowered her salary, improperly
placed her on summer leave and otherwise subjected her to ongoing harassment," all
which were in violation of Minnesota Statutes § 363.03, subdivision 1 (2)(c) (1988). Id.
at 578. The claim for reinstatement and the court's resolution of the duty to defend
the reinstatement claim parallel the resolution of the age discrimination claim, but do
not significantly contribute to this analysis of the case since it does not involve an
intentional act. Id. at 580-81. Discussion of the reinstatement claim is therefore
excluded from this analysis.
127. Id. at 578.
128. Id. The relevant provisions of the insurance contract are as follows:
What This Agreement Covers
This agreement protects against losses and expenses that occur when
claims or suits are brought against you or any protected person for a wrongful
act based on
" An error or omission
" Negligence
* Breach of duty. Or
* Misstatement of misleading statement.
Your liability protection. We'll pay amounts you're legally required to pay
as a result of claims or suits brought against you.
Legal costs and related expenses. We'll defend any suit brought against
you or any protected person for covered claims, even if the suit is groundless
or fraudulent.
Id. at 577-78.
129. Id. at 578.
130. id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 578-79.
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under the insurance contract. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
affirmed."3 The insurer then sought review of the appellate
court ruling with the Minnesota Supreme Court.3 4  The
insurer argued language in the insurance contract did not
include coverage for liability arising out of intentional acts of
agents of the district.' s5 The insurer argued, in the alternative,
if coverage was found under the contract, public policy should
void the contract because it would provide insurance coverage
for liability arising out of intentional wrongful acts that would
"encourage wrongful acts by policy holders." 116
The Independent School District court disagreed with the
insured's construction of the policy. The court first looked to
the express language, which was read to provide coverage for
"wrongful act[s]," based upon a "breach of duty."1"7 "Wrongful
act" was then construed by the court to include criminal, willful,
wanton, or reckless conduct."a Intentional age discrimination
was deemed by the court to be a "wrongful act" based upon a
"breach of duty.""3 9 Therefore, the contract was found to
"unambiguously provide coverage for [the age discrimination]
claim."1"
The Independent School District court also disagreed with the
insured's assertion that providing insurance coverage for
intentional age discrimination would encourage policy holders
to commit wrongful acts."' The insurer argued that a court
of appeals case, which ruled on the insurability of tax liability,
established a public policy based restriction on the insurability
of any kind of intentional, wrongful act. The court, citing
133. Id. at 579.
134. Id. at 577.
135. Id. at 577-78
136. Id. at 580.
137. Id. at 579.
138. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1612 (6th ed. 1990)).
139. Id.
140. Id. The court also distinguished the language in the contract from "errors and
omissions" policies in other cases by noting that the contract at bar provided coverage
for "wrongful acts" in general as opposed to more restrictive language normally found
in "errors and omissions" policies. Id. (distinguishing Richards v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 417 N.W.2d 663 (Minn. CL App. 1988); School Dist. No. 1, Multnomah County v.
Mission Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 929 (1982)).
141. Id. at 580.
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to similar federal court cases, 143 declined to adopt such a broad
rule in the context of school district liability policies, since it did
not believe that "a school district [would] discriminate against its
employees simply because it carries wrongful act insurance
coverage; nor [would] school districts carrying this type of
insurance coverage have a license to commit intentional
wrongs."'
Chris Sorenson
143. Id. The court cited New Madrid County Reorganized School District No. 1 v.
Continental Casualty Co., 904 F.2d 1236 (8th Cir. 1990) and School District For Royal
Oak v. Continental Casualty Co., 912 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1990).
144. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 697, 515 N.W.2d at 580.
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